

DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC

Mr. Chairman:

Because of the difficulties being experienced in the Dominican Republic, perhaps most of the Members of the House are familiar with the geographical location and arrangement of the greater Antilles, which include Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico as the principal islands. They run generally from northwest to southeast in the order that I have just named them. Beyond them to the south and east are the lesser Antilles, made up of the Leeward Islands and Windward Islands. This latter group is sometimes called by the term Caribbees.

Pretty close to the middle of this whole string of islands, and lined between Cuba and Hispaniola, the over-all term for Haiti and the Dominican Republic, lies the Windward Passage, so important to ship travel in the Caribbean.

Specifically, it lies between the eastern tip of Cuba and Haiti. Haiti, in my opinion, is an over-ripe plum ready

to drop at any moment. Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic, which occupies the other half of the island, means a Communist Haiti. Of this there can be little doubt. Should this happen, we would have all of Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic in a straight line extending for a distance of about 1200 miles, from a little bit west of Florida to the southeast -- the whole southern seaward flank of the United States would then be Communist held.

Let us think for a moment what a danger this would pose to us, not only by reason of mere geographical location, but because of the literally thousands of square miles of area ready for military bases and takeoff points for the subversion of the remaining islands and of South America itself.

This cannot be tolerated and I stand ^{firm} ~~fore~~-square with the President on the action he has taken and the statements he has made. The Monroe Doctrine, which was good enough for its day, has become the Johnson Doctrine under these new, very

different and extremely dangerous circumstances. We made one mistake in Cuba. We must never make the same mistake again.

There are those who contend that the rebel activity in the Dominican Republic is nothing more than a proper and legal effort to place Juan Bosch back into the Presidency to which he was duly elected. It may well have been that the rebellion started with this in mind, but there is not the slightest doubt in my mind, and quite apparently in the mind of the President, that the rebellion was taken over by trained hard-core Communists who now intend to exploit the revolution for their own purposes.

What is my basis for this belief? Let me just say that I have good and solid information that this is so.

~~Have you not come at the names of the Communist leaders in the Dominican Republic today?~~

Let me give you a chronology of events starting on April 24.

Let me emphasize that you are not now hearing propaganda --

you are not now hearing a newspaper account of how it happened.

These are the facts -- clear unmistakable, precisely checked
facts.

I will ask you to bear with me while I relate them. They
are highly detailed and very specific.

I recite names -- I give addresses. At least part of my
reason in doing this is to render absolutely certain in the
minds of all Members of the House and all who may read these
remarks later on in the Record that there is no conjecture
here, no exercise of independent judgment -- only a recitation
of facts.

Public disorders and armed violence in the Dominican
Republic, which began to take shape on April 24, 1965, during
the Army Officers' revolt inspired by the PRD, led to the
issuance by President Reid that day of a 6:00 p.m. - 8:00 a.m.

public curfew. The PRD is the group which organized the original revolt to restore Juan Bosch and who, of course, later realized that their ^{revolt was being} ~~(movement had been)~~ taken over by the Castroists and Communist left.

Our information shows that on the evening of April 24, top-level Communist leaders, especially those of the PSPD, recognized that the unstable situation was ripe for subversive exploitation.

Word began to be issued to immediate Party members and opposite numbers in other extremist groups, calling for agitation, calling people into the streets, and the staging of "spot rallies and demonstrations." In the course of the day-time events of April 24, rebel Army officers facilitated the acquisition of weapons by the Communists and other extreme leftists. The same occurred on April ²⁵ ~~23~~, but with many more and heavier weapons falling into their hands and those of the general populace.

The following information reported by various sources from April 24 to date, highlights the involvement of various known Communists and subversive-directed armed civilians in four respects: (1) Paramilitary-Activities and installations, (2) Political Action and Propaganda, (3) Organization and Strong Points, and (4) Infiltration of Leadership.

On the early morning of April 25, Narcisco ISA-~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ^{CONFIDENTIAL}, Manuel GONZALEZ Gonzalez, Diomedes Mercedes BATISTA, and Asdrubal DOMINQUEZ ^Guerrero were observed in Parque Independencia -- all carrying weapons.

On the afternoon of April 25, Communist leaders Ariosto ^{SORA} ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~, Milvio PEREZ Perez, Silvano LORA Vincente -- responding to a call issued over a rebel-held radio station -- all proceeded to the presidential palace, armed with molotov cocktails.

At 9:00 a.m. on April 28 the Villa Consuelo police station was surrounded by armed civilians who out-numbered the police inside. The station was over-run by 9:30. Police

caught inside were shot on the spot. Others who managed to get out were pursued and shot when captured. A number of official U.S. sources reported fatal, cold-blooded execution of National Police personnel captured by armed civilian rebels.

On April 28, armed rebels turned their attention to the forced entry and sacking of such local banks as the Dominican Reserve Bank, the Duarte Branch of the Royal Bank of Canada (with reported \$250,000 cash on hand), and the First National City Bank of New York (reportedly with some \$250,000 cash on hand).

On April 28, armed civilian looters broke into the large "La Norma" department store in downtown Santo Domingo. Army troops sent to rout them were immediately engaged in a fire fight. The above reports of sacking and looting undoubtedly represent only a fraction of the total property damage and financial losses suffered by private institutions and businesses.

On April 25, Narciso PICHARDO Vicioso, Antonio ISA
~~ONDA~~, and Eduardo NOUELLEMENT Roques took advantage of the
capture and sacking of the daily Prensa Libre newspaper's
offices and plant by preparing immediately to use the
facilities for producing propaganda leaflets.

NO
On April 25, subversive-directed mobs in Santo Domingo
~~and Santiago de los Caballeros (the country's second city)~~
undertook the sacking of the offices of such anti-
Communist political parties as the Partido Liberal
Evolucionistas, Union Civica Nacional, and Vanguardia
Revolucionaria Dominicana.

On April 27, a subversive-directed force sacked the
main offices of Listin Diario, a major daily newspaper in
Santo Domingo.

By the evening of April 27, the PSPD's leaders were
aware of talks which spokesmen for the rebel side had had

the same day with the U.S. Ambassador. The next day the PSPD put out a propaganda fly-sheet containing as one of its points the charge that the U.S. Embassy was interfering in the country's internal political affairs.

Early in the week the PSPD distributed a fly-sheet entitled "Juan Bosch to Power Through People's Action."

On April 27 Emma TAVAREZ Justo, university student activist and APCJ militant, was exhorting the public to continue the revolt. (She is the sister of Manuel ("MANOLO") TAVAREZ Justo, foremost Fidelista leader of the APCJ, who was killed in the Party's abortive 1963 guerrilla movement.)

~~According to eye-witnesses, Rafael BONILLA Aybar, vociferously anti-Communist newsmen (Prensa Libre editor and radio-tv commentator), was machine gunned to death by a civilian rebel group. (It had been reported earlier that~~

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~~BONILLA Aybar had been captured in the port section when trying to flee the country by sea.)~~

*Later reports
prove this
wrong*

Virtually immediately after the news of the coup d'etat became public, leaders of the three extreme leftist political parties began collecting arms, organizing their forces and creating strongpoints. By the third day of the revolt, the extreme left, acting both independently and in concert, had established strongpoints and temporary headquarters at the following places:

The Partido Socialista Popular Dominicano (PSPD-orthodox Communist) established its principal strongpoint at the house of party leader,

^B
~~A~~uenaventura Johnson Pimental², at

No. 56 Calle Espayillat. Crudely fortified machine gun emplacements were set up on the roof of the house. PSPD activists, including Johnson, Nicolas Richardo Vigioso, Manuel Ortiz, Ignacio Perez and others were observed on 25 April making Molotov cocktails and home-made grenades. The PSPD, I wish all members of the House to know, is the Dominican Popular Socialist Party which follows Moscow's direction. The house continued to serve as arsenal and as base for the main PSPD paramilitary forces throughout the revolt. It also served for a time as the main military headquarters for the PSPD forces. The PSPD moved its headquarters to the house of Rafael Estevez Weber on the night of 27 April, probably for security reasons, but the Johnson house remained an important strongpoint and arsenal.

A building at the corner of Arz. Portes and Calle Sanchez, also served as a PSPD stronghold. Diomedes Mercedes Garcia, Jose Rodriguez Acosta and others were stationed there, leading another paramilitary troop which was heavily armed with submachine guns and rifles, Molotov cocktails and hand grenades.

PSPD central committee members, ^{APCO leader} Fidelio Despradel Roque and Juan Miguel Roman, established a strongpoint at the corner of Calle Estrellita and Arz. Neuel in the downtown district on 26 April and commanded a paramilitary troop from this base.

The Agrupacion Political Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14 June Movement) had a strong point on Jose Gabriel St. near Malecon in Ciudad Nueva. A heavily armed paramilitary force used this as base.

Joint meetings of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD - Bosch's party) were held at the home of PSPD members, Nicolas Pichardo Viciaso, on the morning of 27 April. The purpose of these meetings was to coordinate military and political action concerning the revolt.

The headquarters and principal strongpoint of the Movimiento Popular Dominicano (MPD) was located on Calle Benigne in the downtown district. The MPD, the members of the House should understand, is the Dominican Popular Movement, and is a small but very aggressive Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party which follows the Chinese communist ideological line.

On 29 and 30 April the MPD paramilitary force based here was concentrating on an attack on the Fortaleza Ozama, an important municipal police headquarters. It was largely this MPD force which eventually succeeded in overrunning the Fortaleza in the early morning of 30 April. Parenthetically, the MPD force was reported in high spirits at this time, certain of victory and the return of Juan Bosch under conditions which would make possible the total seizure of power by the three

Infiltration of Communists into Rebel Military and Political Organizations

On the evening of 25 April, PSPD leaders, Diomedes Mercedes Batista, Luis Gomez Perez, Silvano ^L~~La~~ Vicente, Antonio, Narciso and Amado ^{ESA}~~ESA~~ Condo, Aricosto ^S~~S~~ Valerio and others attended political meetings at the National Palace.

Facundo Gomez, one-time member of the PRD, who is now associated with the 14 June Movement, was a participant in top level political councils at the National Palace of both the PRD and, later, the provisional government. Gomez was observed at the Palace conferring with provisional president Rafael Molina Urena on 25 April. Parenthetically, it appears that Gomez took paramilitary training in Cuba. He took part in an attempted landing of a paramilitary team with supplies of weapons on the north coast of the island in November 1963. The team was launched from Cuba.

PSPD leaders, in particular Diomedes Mercedes ^{BATISTA}~~Garcia~~, on several occasions in the revolt, have expressed satisfaction with the attitude of Captain Mario Pena Taveras, one of the Army rebels, calling him a "friend of the Party."

A rebel leader, retired Lt. Col. Rafael E. Saldana Jimenez, who now practices law, was acting as legal adviser to the rebel military officers occupying the National Palace. Saldana is closely connected with the 14 June Movement and is reported to have used his military status during 1963 to secure weapons for the Movement. ^{Leaders of the 14 June Movement and PSPD were in communication with}
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Saldana on 27 April and on other occasions.

The rebel provisional government was influenced to appoint to posts of considerable importance, three persons whose Communist sympathies and associations are well established. These appointments manifest an attempt to establish control of both security and the procuratorate, through which the extreme left could eliminate persons opposed to them.

e ~~Chief~~ *President of the Supreme Court*
Alfredo Conde Pauses, appointed ~~Attorney General~~, who has close family connections with the 14 June Movement.

Luis Homero Lajara Burges, a former Trujillista ~~who is now reliably reported to be an underground member or associate of the PCPD~~, appointed director of the National Department of Investigations, which is the Dominican Security service.

Alejandro Lajara, the son of Luis (above), a leading member of the 14 June Movement, sub-director of the National Investigations Department.

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| <p>Remarks: The attached text has been reviewed for accuracy, and changes made therein. We have a reservation about the reference to the "Johnson Doctrine" on p.2. While this would read well to the US public, the reaction in Latin America would be strongly adverse. Most of the facts referred to on p.4. have since appeared in the press.</p> <p>We do not feel that it is for us to tell members of Congress whether to make speeches. This is between them and the White House.</p> | | | |
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